INTRODUCTION
For those who play poker, there are basically two ways to win. You must either have the best cards on the table when the betting is done, or you must make the other players think you do and have them decide not to play any further. Saddam Hussein and others like him know how to play this second type of game quite well. Unfortunately, as all indications seem to show, he's quickly gaining the cards necessary to play the first type of game. Success in this high stakes game of international terrorism may depend on knowing when a good bluffer has transitioned from a bluff to actually having a strong set of cards in his hand. Further, when the other guy feels he has nothing to lose, the game may become impossible to win.
In the future, with the increase in counterproliferation efforts, there may be fewer acts of terror, but that these terrorist acts may be more lethal than terrorist acts in the past and may work their way closer to U.S. territory. The world may see more terrorist attacks using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) due to a lack of regard for traditional restraints such as International Treaties, the end of the superpower stalemate and as a new breed of terrorist groups begin to assert themselves. These terror groups, similar to the Aum Shrinkyo Cult, pose a particular concern as they base their beliefs on fulfilling religious and apocalyptic goals. Many of these groups also possess a deeply held hatred of the U.S. and have no aversion to mass casualties. Further, sponsor states of these groups may become more aggressive and antagonistic towards the U.S. Our national survival may not be at stake, however, these new "warriors" could complicate U.S. engagement in an overseas conflict and may have a dramatic impact on the will and determination of the U.S. and our allies through the use of weapons of mass destruction.
PROLIFERATION AS THE PROMINENT SECURITY TREAT IN THE 1990's
The 1993 Report on the Bottom Up Review stated that 25 nations either have or are attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. These proliferators include a high number of countries from the Middle East, where the U.S. has a vital strategic interest, and where some countries, such as Iraq, have shown a willingness to use such weapons.
In most areas where U.S. forces could potentially be engaged, our likely adversaries already possess chemical and biological weapons. Several conditions that have contributed to the spread of WMD include: alternative suppliers of WMD technologies and delivery systems, the continuous improvement in capabilities of the countries involved, and finally, the challenges associated with controlling dual-use technologies. 2 A recent comprehensive report, the Commission on America's National Interests, concluded that it is a vital national interest to "prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States.'" The dominant security threat for the United States, as identified by the Clinton Administration in Presidential Directive 39 and the Report on the Bottom Up Review, is the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and the missile systems designed to deliver them.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) is nothing new. The world has been wrestling with their use and trying to keep these tools out of "conventional" warfare for almost as long as warfare has been around. In fact, within the last 300 years alone, the world has tried on several occasions to establish formal agreements that controlled CBW. The Strasbourg Agreement of 1675 between France and Germany forbade the use of poisoned weapons and bullets followed by agreements such as the 1874 "International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War", and the Hague Convention of 1899. 5 Each of these documents was written with the hope of controlling the potential mass destruction to soldiers and civilians offered by these weapons of terror. Yet, even with these declarations, there were increasingly toxic gas exchanges between France and Germany during WWI, both ratifiers of the 1899
Convention and signatories to the gas declaration. 6 Though there were some infractions of the 1925
Geneva Protocol after WWI, the international norm against their use largely prevailed and it was not until the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s that a large-scale extended violation of the Geneva Protocol took place. 7 At least two conclusions can be drawn from this. First, an international treaty docs not provide an absolute guarantee of deterrence. Second, the potential for use of WMD by a country (like Iraq) may depend more on that country's current geopolitical situation and not necessarily on the treaties and declarations it agrees to.
THE DECLINE IN THE STRENGTH OF TREATIES
The moral authority of treaties and world opinion have also been a factor that helped deter the There are several reasons for investing in WMD capabilities: to counter threats to homeland security, to project power regionally, to deter or counter great power influence or intervention, and to gain status as a global power. Chemical and biological weapons have become the poor man's_atom bomb. A nation's possession of WMD can provide that nation with an asymmetric warfare capability giving it greater influence within a specified region. This type of asymmetric warfare can even dramatically tip the balance of power within a region. In some cases, it may allow a country with a much smaller defense budget to be able to stand toe-to-toe with a more powerful adversary like the United States. The Iran-Iraq War proved that the use of WMD can be a relatively inexpensive way to tip the balance of power, if not within a region, then at least within a conflict.
CONTINUING PROLIFERATION IN GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
The A terrorist nation doesn't necessarily need advanced delivery means. Biological and chemical weapons can be deployed by various alternative delivery means that do not require long-range ballistic missiles. Covert or unconventional means of delivery of WMD include cargo ships, passenger aircraft, commercial and private vehicles, and commercial cargo shipments routed through numerous ports. A rogue state might penetrate the American homeland and release an agent clandestinely to achieve plausible deniability. Verifying and determining responsibility are difficult enough with an overt attack such as terrorist bombs; and may be near impossible with a covert attack using CBW. Even so, once the determination that an attack has in fact occurred and blame has been fixed on a specific state or group, the U.S. must then make the decision whether or not it is feasible to retaliate or perhaps to escalate. 
WEAKENED INTERNATIONAL RESOLVE

IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR
The recurring question of why CW was not used in the Gulf War plays a key role in this 
ATTACKS ON COALITION PARTNERS AND ALLIANCES
A coalition partner incapable of exercising effective passive or active defensive measures may prove a liability for the CINC and this will need to be calculated into any force planning. Should the U.S. respond with the belief that an attack on a partner is an attack on the U.S.? If so, the U.S. must determine whether a nuclear response by the U.S. to a CBW attack on an ally is appropriate. The political ramifications of exploding a nuclear weapon in response to anything but an overt nuclear provocation may be diplomatic suicide with some of our other allies in a highly volatile area such as Southwest Asia. The diplomatic baggage associated with nuclear weapons present nearly universal distaste for their use. The U.S. must deter use or threats of use by regional proliferators when our interests or those of our friends and allies are threatened using a full spectrum of responses, not solely limited to nuclear retaliation. The former Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Mr John Deuten, stated, "There is not a threat in the world today or a vital interest that can not be met and/or protected by conventional weapons". 25 It appears then, that our "response-in-kind" theory may not be the current choice for a course of action.
There is also a significant and growing threat of attack by weapons of mass destruction on targets that are not considered military targets in the usual sense of the term. The threat posed to the citizens of the United States by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by unconventional means is significant and growing. 20 The March 1988 Iraqi chemical attack on the Kurds in Halabjah, and the muted world response to the use of gas on civilians serves as just one illustration of this growing threat. 27 As Senator Richard Lugar observed, "Americans have every reason to expect a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack before the decade is over." 28 The bombing of the world Trade
Center in New York illustrated that our homeland is no longer immune. The potential for chemical and biological terrorism against the U.S. is perhaps the threat of most concern, and it is finally receiving substantial attention by our government. In fact, one senator that believes the U.S. is not prepared to deal with chemical and biological terrorism has warned, "An attack of this kind is not a question of'if, but is a question of 'when'."
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CURRENT DOMESTIC RESPONSE
The two agencies with primary responsibility for reacting to terrorist employment of a CBW within United States territory are the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
FEMA is tasked to respond to any domestic disaster situation, regardless of cause.' However, neither of these organizations has a robust technical capability to manage an incident involving the use of Timely response is dependent on the location of the attack in relation to the forces positioned to react. However, an incident will most likely occur where the military does not have forces prepositioned to react to the attack. Even with an established response force, terrorist can be expected to choose a target which will not lend itself to easy response. A second consideration is that the intent of the terrorist in using CBW can be reasonably assumed to cause casualties and panic amongst the civilian population, embarrassment for the government and most of all, media attention. Fear of retaliation becomes much less of a deterrent when chaos, paranoia, and internal distrust can be created in the target country without a linkage to the perpetrator.
CURRENT DEFENSIVE MEASURES
In the case of a biological attack, an enemy is unlikely to reveal in advance which bacteria or virus it will use. The biological agent would most likely not be detected for hours or days. Therefore, unfortunately, the first indication we may get that there has been a WMD attack is reports of massive casualties. Chemical attacks would yield almost immediate casualties and probably would not involve persistent agents. This would cause a more immediate workload on medical personnel but few additional casualties. Due to their lack of equipment (the protective mask in particular) and training, civilian targets are much more susceptible to CBW attacks than are their military counterparts.
Biological attacks have a potential for producing very large numbers of casualties, in the range of 90-100 percent as a function of the type of pathogen and medical treatment available. By the time casualties appeared and we learned there had been a biological weapon attack, it would be too late for vaccination to be effective for victims of the primary exposure and would be strictly consequence management.
AMERICA'S DETERRENCE
Going back to our analogy of the poker game, a player may win the game without having the best cards in the deck. He may only need the best cards in a particular hand. It is here that Saddam has gained an advantage. He has shown on more than one occasion that he is willing to test American resolve and push the world's patience to the extreme. Ever since Operation Desert Storm, standoffs with
Saddam have played out with a kind of unthreatening predictability. He huffs and puffs; the United
States lobs a few cruise missiles into Iraq, or threatens to; the crisis flares and then passes. The vast coalition that ousted Iraq in 1991 has dissolved and except for Britain, few of America's friends have any stomach for another round of fighting in the gn 1 f; all within a seven year span.' 1 Most nations just want to wish away the problem and believe this round and the next round will continue to pass.
However, the real threat isn't that Saddam has discounted the American will to challenge him, the real threat comes is that he may have good reason to do so. American military forces may not have the cards necessary to win this hand. And even if we have a few trump cards on display such as carriers in the gulf, we may not come out of the next dispute unscathed. With the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction acting as the great equalizer, a powerful regional nation, such as Iraq, may be able to hold the last great superpower in check.
COUNTERING U.S. CONVENTIONAL FORCES
If an opponent armed with CBW judges a U.S. conventional threat to be insufficient to alter his decision to employ them, and judges the U.S. nuclear threat as too politically sensitive to be used, an effective U.S. military deterrent may not be possible.' 15 The U.S. military may be too large and unwieldy to pose a threat to some potential adversaries. A key element of U.S. strategy that might create an incentive for early use of CBW by an adversary is our need for time for a force build-up and the need for the U.S. to fight using coalition warfare.
As America has returned the majority of its forces to the continental United States, these forces have become even more dependent on strategic mobility-they can't fight and win if they can't get there. Without a robust strategic transportation system, as was demonstrated during the Desert Shield deployment, America's armed forces would be a paper tiger, unable to defend America's security interests or those of its allies. 35 The vast majority of military forces in any large conflict, up to 95% of all tonnage, will be transported by sealift." 17 Also, in a major conflict more than half of the air mobility fleet and virtually all of the sealift fleet will be dependent on civilian crew members. Most in-theater port operations will also be dependent on civilian personnel. Therefore, an attack on key, in-theater air and sea ports would most likely disrupt a major deployment to such a degree that it might ultimately result in the defeat of U.S. forces. America's defense transportation system's high level of dependence on the commercial/civilian sector, may ultimately prove to be the "Achilles Heel" of America's defense forces. 
NEW WARRIOR CLASS
To this point, we have discussed nations and the rules that exist to govern those nations.
However, the only way to truly understand the possible actions that may come into play is to gain an insight into the leadership. Ralph Peters suggests that in the future, America "will face [warriors] who have acquired a taste for killing, who do not behave rationally according to our definition of rationality,
•
• who are capable of atrocities that challenge the descriptive powers of language, and who will sacrifice their own kind in order to survive."" Knowing that there are those who wish us significant harm and that they have both the ability and the will to use weapons of mass destruction to cause that harm, we clearly have a problem. As one member of the Hezbollah noted, "We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy." "
The acquisition or the development and use of weapons of mass destruction is well within the capability of many extremists and terrorist movements, acting independently or as proxies. Foreign states can transfer weapons to or otherwise aid extremist and terrorist movements indirectly and with plausible deniability. 43 Retired Ambassador Morris Busby, former Counterterrorism Coordinator for the U.S. government, warned that rogue states and subnational groups may now be more inclined than previously to "punish" us with WMD simply for being who we are. 44 An irrational opponent could respond in an unpredictable manner to our threats of deterrence. Further, deterrence will not work if the opposing leadership places supreme importance on a particular goal, and believes a specific course of action to be essential to the attainment ofthat goal. When leaders are wholly committed to achieving a goal "at any cost", then deterrence will not operate as intended because no threatened "cost" will be sufficient to deter the actions deemed essential to achieving that strategic goal. The world, led by the U.S., must not only denounce the use of WMD, but also follow-up that talk with direct action to halt the flow of materiel into unstable nations.
Preparation of the U.S. population for the potential consequences of a WMD attack is also essential. Education versus panic is crucial to success in meeting this threat. Use counterproliferation methods to the greatest extent possible, but plan for a worst case scenario. We must strengthen our decreased. The probability of use against U.S. forces is on the rise. While there is some debate concerning the effectiveness of CBW against well-trained, well-equipped, disciplined forces, there is no question these weapons would be devastating against civilian populations and other soft targets such as sea and air ports. Further, the American military has been shown to be deficient in its ability to fight in a chemical or biological environment. The American public will not tolerate needless casualties and a chemical or biological strike resulting in large numbers of American casualties could decimate the public's will to engage in a conflict; especially one not threatening our vital interests. If another government realizes we are not fully ready to fight this type of war and that we are not willing to use our full spectrum of capabilities in response to their use or threatened use of WMD, then that nation may be more likely to acquire and use WMD. Regardless of the final outcome of the conflict, exploitation of this vulnerability may permit an adversary to raise the stakes and achieve a strategic victory without our ever knowing the true nature of the cards he holds in his hand. America must not let this happen.
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